Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration
A practical course for IT, security and architecture staff on moving to post-quantum cryptography: the threat and timeline, the NIST standards and hybrid key exchange, published deadlines, cryptographic inventory and crypto-agility, and running the migration. Five modules, each with a worked example, and a 10-question final quiz. Based on cited official pages. Not an accredited qualification and not legal advice.
What you will learn
- Explain and apply: Explain how Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms affect RSA, ECC and symmetric keys, and use Mosca-style reasoning with harvest-now-decrypt-later without inventing a Q-day date.
- Explain and apply: Identify FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), the announced HQC backup, and when hybrid key exchange is the right transition step.
- Explain and apply: Read the NIST, NSA, UK NCSC and EU deadlines as published, know whom each binds, and build a dated plan from the earliest applicable one.
- Explain and apply: Build a cryptographic inventory, find where cryptography hides, assess crypto-agility and prioritise systems for migration.
- Explain and apply: Run a post-quantum migration: pilot hybrid TLS, test size and performance impacts, question vendors and track progress under clear governance.
Modules
- The threat and the timeline
- The NIST standards and hybrid key exchange
- Published deadlines and guidance
- Inventory and crypto-agility
- Running the migration
Course facts
- Estimated study time
- about 80 minutes
- Final assessment
- 10 questions · Pass mark 80%
- Available in
- English, Français, العربية
- Price
- Free. Optional verifiable certificate: $5
- Last updated
- Published by
- AMAADOR ACADEMY
Who this course is for
IT, security and architecture staff, including security architects, infrastructure and application engineers, PKI and key-management owners, and the managers who plan their work.
Prerequisites
Working knowledge of TLS, certificates and public-key versus symmetric cryptography. No mathematics beyond that is required. Leaders who want the board-level view can take the cyber risk governance course for boards.
Course content
1. The threat and the timeline
Public-key cryptography rests on mathematical problems that are hard for classical computers: factoring large integers (RSA) and computing discrete logarithms (Diffie-Hellman, elliptic curves such as ECDH and ECDSA). Shor’s algorithm, run on a large enough fault-tolerant quantum computer, solves both efficiently. Bigger RSA or ECC keys do not rescue them in any practical way, which is why the answer is new algorithms, not longer keys. A computer able to do this is usually called cryptographically relevant; none is publicly known to exist today.
Symmetric cryptography and hashing are affected differently. Grover’s algorithm gives a quadratic speed-up for brute-force search, so the effective strength of a key is roughly halved in bits. The usual practical reading is modest: use AES-256 rather than AES-128 where long-term strength matters, and keep hash outputs long. Grover does not break AES the way Shor breaks RSA. This is why the migration effort concentrates on key establishment and digital signatures, and not on re-engineering every cipher.
Nobody can responsibly give a date for when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will arrive; hardware roadmaps are vendor targets, not facts, and this course does not use a “Q-day”. You do not need one. Harvest-now-decrypt-later means an adversary can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it later. Mosca-style reasoning turns this into a comparison: if the years your data must stay confidential (X) plus the years your migration will take (Y) exceed the years before the threat exists (Z, unknown), you are already late. Because Z is unknown, you plan with ranges and start with the largest X and Y.
2. The NIST standards and hybrid key exchange
In August 2024 NIST published the first three final post-quantum standards. FIPS 203 specifies ML-KEM, a key-encapsulation mechanism derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber, used to establish shared secret keys. FIPS 204 specifies ML-DSA, a lattice-based signature scheme derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium, intended as the general-purpose signature. FIPS 205 specifies SLH-DSA, a stateless hash-based signature derived from SPHINCS+, a conservative alternative whose security rests on hash functions only. A further signature standard based on FALCON has been announced as in development; check the NIST project page for its status.
As announced in 2025, NIST also selected HQC as a backup key-encapsulation algorithm built on a different mathematical family (error-correcting codes), so that a future weakness in lattices would not leave the world without an alternative. Check the NIST project page for the current standardisation status. The practical lesson is design-level: do not hard-wire one algorithm into a protocol or product. Parameter sets also matter: ML-KEM and ML-DSA each come in several sizes, and your policy and your regulator may name the one you must use.
3. Published deadlines and guidance
Several public bodies have published transition dates. Every date in this lesson is as published at the access date; deadlines can be revised, so check the current text before you put one in a plan. NIST IR 8547, in its initial public draft, proposes that quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms such as RSA and elliptic-curve schemes be deprecated after 2030 and then disallowed after 2035; check whether a final version has since replaced the draft. The NSA’s CNSA 2.0 advisory sets algorithm choices and staged dates for US national security systems, with the overall transition running to 2035, and names, among others, ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87 and AES-256.
The UK NCSC publishes three milestones for organisations: by 2028, define migration goals, complete discovery of your cryptographic assets and build an initial plan; by 2031, carry out the highest-priority migration activity; by 2035, complete migration. The EU’s coordinated implementation roadmap, as published by Member States with the Commission, asks them to start the transition by the end of 2026, to protect high-risk use cases by the end of 2030, and to transition as many systems as feasible by 2035. Some national authorities in other countries have published their own, different schedules.
4. Inventory and crypto-agility
You cannot migrate what you cannot see. The first deliverable is a cryptographic inventory, sometimes called a cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM): for each use of cryptography, the algorithm and key size, the protocol or library, the system and owner, the certificate and its lifetime, and the data protected. Government guidance such as CISA’s quantum readiness material and the NCSC timelines put discovery and inventory first for exactly this reason. Start with what you already have: configuration management, certificate inventories and scan results, then add tooling that reads libraries and binaries.
Cryptography hides in more places than TLS on the public website. Look at internal TLS and service-to-service links, VPN and remote-access gateways, the public key infrastructure and its root and issuing keys, code signing and software-update chains, device firmware and secure boot, hardware security modules and key-management services, databases and backups with encrypted fields, email and document signing, identity and single sign-on tokens, and above all third parties: SaaS providers, payment and telecom links, embedded products and managed services. For each third party, your dependency is the algorithm they use on your behalf, so ask them.
5. Running the migration
Run the migration as a programme with phases: discovery, pilots, then staged rollout and retirement of old algorithms. A good first pilot is hybrid key exchange on one internal or low-risk external service, where you control both ends. Prove that clients and servers negotiate it, that logs and monitoring show which group was used, and that a fallback exists if something fails. Only then widen. Do not start with the most critical system, and do not leave pilots without an exit decision.
Post-quantum algorithms change sizes and timings, so test them. Larger key shares and certificates add bytes to every handshake, which can push packets past a network MTU, break middleboxes, firewalls and inspection devices that assume small hellos, and slow constrained devices and busy load balancers. Measure handshake time, CPU, memory, packet fragmentation and failure rates before and after, on real network paths, and include old clients. Check that hardware security modules and smart cards support the new algorithms and what throughput they offer.
Vendors are part of your migration. Ask each one in writing: which NIST algorithms and parameter sets do you support or plan to support, with what dates; is a hybrid mode available; can we configure algorithms ourselves; how do you support crypto-agility; and what do you do about your own supply chain and firmware signing. Treat vague answers as a risk. Governance then ties it together: one accountable owner, a tracked register fed from the inventory, a regular report of percentage of high-priority systems migrated, exceptions with expiry dates, and a review whenever a standard or deadline changes.
The full lesson continues in the interactive course on this page.
Sources and references
- Post-Quantum Cryptography project
- FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard
- FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard
- FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard
- NIST IR 8547: Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (initial public draft)
- Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 advisory
- Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography
- Coordinated implementation roadmap for the transition to post-quantum cryptography
- Quantum readiness
Education only. It is not legal, financial or professional advice and not an accredited qualification. Official sources are summarised as read on the access date; standards and deadlines can change, so check the current text. Figures in worked examples are illustrative.